Learning Surveillance Systems

Several years ago, during my postdoctoral work on algorithmic surveillance, I was warning of the problems associated with the development of heuristic (learning) software applied to surveillance systems. I argued that their popularity would grow as the amount of data acquired through growing numbers of cameras that could not possibly be watched by human operators. Today in CSO Security and Risk, a magazine for ´security executives´, there is a piece by Eric Eaton which summarises the current state of the art, and which makes exactly that argument as a reason why operators of surveillance systems should consider using such learning software. As Eaton says,

¨Various tools have emerged that not only “see video better,” but also analyze the digitized output of video cameras in real time to learn and recognize normal behavior, and detect and alert on all abnormal patterns of activity without any human input.¨

Judge, jury... and executioner
Judge, jury... and executioner (IPC magazines)

The key issue here, and one which I mentioned in my post about angry robots the other day, is the automated determination of normality. As French theorist, Michalis Lianos, argued in Le Nouveau Contrôle Social back in 2001, the implementation of these kinds of systems threatens to replace social negotiation with a process of judgement and sometimes even the consequences (which in some border control systems can be fatal – Judge Dredd as computer).

Eaton identifies the first part of this conundrum when he says that ¨the key to successful surveillance is learning normal behaviors¨and he believes that this will enable systems to filter out such activity and ¨help predict, and prevent, future threats.¨ He does admit that in many cases the numbers of actual instances of systems detecting suspicious behaviour is very small and therefore the cost of systems may not be economically justified, but there is as usual amongst his ´5 musts´ for security operators, no place to be found for ethics, human rights (or indeed humanity outside of systems operators) or consideration of the wider social impacts of the growth in use of learning security machines.

No doubt he would say, as most developers and operators do, that this is simply a matter of how systems are used in compliance with best practice and the law, which in itself ignores the possibility of already consciously or unconsciously programmed-in biases, but the more that systems become intelligent and are able to make decisions independently of human operators, the thinner this legalistic response becomes. I´m not saying that we are about to have automatic car park CCTV cameras with guns any time soon, but it´s about time we had some forward-looking policy on the use of heuristic systems before they become as normal as Eaton suggests…

Virtual surveillance fail

this Open-Circuit TV (OCTV) is also about ´responsibilizing´citizens, trying to turn ordinary people into civic spies. Luckily, whilst people love to watch, they generally refuse to behave as agents of surveillance

The US-Mexican border has been a pretty good barometer of the levels of paranoia, waste and stupidity around immigration and surveillance for quite some time now. Now the El Paso Times of Texas reports on the stupendous failure of one massive initiative that was supposed to spread the burden of watching the border by installing webcams (and associated infrastructure) for US citizens to watch online and report anything suspicious.

Around $2 Million US was sunk into the program, yet it had few tangible outcomes. The figures, released under the Texas Public Information Act show that despite 1,894,288 hits on the website, there have been just 3 arrests out of a projected 1200, and only 8 incidents reported in total out of a projected 50,000.

What made me laugh was the comment from the office of Governor Rick Perry, who initiated the scheme, that the only problem was the way in which the scheme´s success had been assessed – there is a quote from a spokesperson that is a classic of government evasion: apparently, ¨the progress reports need to be adjusted to come in line with the strategy¨!

The only sensible comment on the whole debacle comes from Scott Stewart, a surveillance and security expert from Stratfor, who notes as all surveillance experts already know, that cameras are not that effective at deterring or stopping crime, and blames our naive faith in technological solutions that ¨can provide us with a false sense of security¨.

This isn´t just about whether cameras work though.

Of course there are wider issues about the fairness of US relations with Mexico which, under NAFTA, effectively mean that the US uses Mexico as a source of cheap labour and land for manufacturing and the free flow of goods, but does not permit the free flow of people. However for studies of surveillance, it is also about whether encouraging virtual voyeurism is either socially desirable or effective in reducing crime. In terms of effectiveness, of course Bruce Schneier has been arguing for quite a while that most security schemes are inefficient and counterproductive and there was an excellent paper by John Mueller of Ohio State University exploding the statistical myths around security measures in the War on Terror.

But this Open-Circuit Television (OCTV) – not the the usual Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) we are used to in malls and big cities – is also about ´responsibilizing´citizens, trying to turn ordinary people into civic spies. Luckily, whilst people love to watch, they generally refuse to behave as states would want and do not willingly become agents of surveillance – as this scheme and the experiment in the London borough of Shoreditch with such participatory surveillance schemes, which was similarly successful amongst viewers but achieved no measurable result and was shelved, show.

Note: Hille Koskela of the University of Helsinki, who works mainly on webcams, has been following the Texas border watch scheme and will be presenting a paper on it at our Surveillance, Security and Social Control in Latin America sumposium here in Curitiba in March… I look forward to hearing her analysis.

CCTV is good for something… or is it?

MSNBC has some great footage of US Airways 1549 that crash-landed in the Hudson yesterday, taken from CCTV cameras on a nearby wharf.

However well this footage shows the undoubted skill of the pilot, I can’t help thinking every time I see this kind of use of CCTV footage that it must play a really important part in the process of normalisation. The fact that people can see footage from CCTV on the news adds to a largely mistaken impression that video surveillance ‘works’. It doesn’t matter whether the footage is of an amazing tale of heroism and survival, a crash or a crime prevented or committed, the images have a pre-rational power. They create a ‘demand’ for more cameras or the idea that they are necessary even though we may be watching something that nothing to do with the purpose of the cameras, and may even, as in the case of images of crime occurring, be witnessing the overt failure of the preventative purpose of CCTV.

Still, great video, isn’t it?

San Francisco CCTV (slight return)

The San Francisco Chronicle is reporting that a murder suspect was arrested as a result of CCTV footage. This comes hot on the heels of the critical report that I mentioned a few days ago. Is it a coincidence that we see these kinds of stories now? I think not. It seems that the SF police may be doing some spin-doctoring to counter any perception that the cameras ‘don’t work’. SF residents should expect more of the same over the next few weeks…

Winnipeg gets CCTV

Well, another city authority is apparently paying no attention to the continuous stream of assessments of CCTV systems in practice. This time, it’s Winnipeg in Canada. The cheif of police is hopeful that the small 10-camera system will work and is already saying he hopes it will be extended… before we know whether it will or won’t work. As usual the story is nothing but boosterism and contains no contrary view at all. I can predict a stream of (police) anecdotes about crimes ‘solved’ by the cameras for a few months and how much safer the town is, and then a couple of years down the line, a report showing that nothing much has changed in reality…

New Report on CCTV

CITRIS Report on CCTV in San Fransisco
CITRIS Report on CCTV in San Fransisco

Another new report shows that CCTV is not quite as effective as its advocates claim. The CITRIS report on the 4-year old, 70-camera, system in San Francisco, written by Jennifer King, Professor Deirdre Mulligan and Professor Steven Raphael shows that although there was a 20% reduction in crime against property crime in the areas covered by the cameras, crime against the person (robbery, mugging, assault, rape etc.) remained unaffected. This just adds the findings of many studies in the United Kingdom that show the same lack of preventative power from video surveillance.