David Loukidelis, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, speaking today at The Surveillance Games workshop, has made it quite clear that his office does not want the Winter Games to leave a legacy of securitization in the city or indeed, fear (as the Assistant Federal Privacy Commissioner, Chantal Bernier, put it), in the consciousness of its residents. In particular he argued that the 600 (yes, 600) cameras that are being installed at the Olympic venues and beyond should not be allowed to remain after the games. I hope that his office is able to deliver on this view, but I doubt that it will. As Kevin Haggerty and Phil Boyle have noted, security architecture is now an actual deliverable of the Olympics, and as many other researchers have shown, such architecture, including in particular CCTV but also adjusted local or national laws on the thematic and spatial limits of protest and freedom of expression (which, as Michael Vonn of the BCCLA and Chris Shaw, a leading anti-games activist, are describing at this very moment in the conference, are themselves often illegal and unconstitutional) tends not only to persist but to act as a kind of Trojan Horse for an expanded surveillance. And as Vonn’s group has also shown – the city is building a permanent CCTV control centre as part of the security architecture for the Games, and you don’t do that for cameras that are going to be removed.
Tag: surveillance
Surveillance State, USA
There’s a really good article by Alfred McCoy here, on the US surveillance state. I am currently reading his brilliant new book, Policing America’s Empire.
Guardian article
The Guardian‘s Comment is Free site published a short version of my critiques of RIPA today… you can read it here.
Or the full version prior to editing is here:
A little-known tribunal is meeting this week to consider a case a case of wrongful surveillance. The case brought by Jenny Paton and Tim Joyce against Poole District Council in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Tribunal concerns the local authority’s targeted surveillance measures against the couple and their children in an investigation of their application for school places. Among other activities, council employees trailed the family and interrogated neighbours.
The case comes in the same week that the government issued its response to a consultation process on the reform of the law which the tribunal oversees: the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) (2000). RIPA has proved controversial as it seems to give many different public bodies new powers of surveillance, but that isn’t entirely true: as many local council officials admit, much of this was going on before 2000, but RIPA regulates and restricts it – in fact, it restricts it too much to some of the published responses to the consultation process. It is, however, almost impossible to determine whether RIPA has increased or decreased surveillance of this kind as no consistent records were kept prior to RIPA’s introduction. What is certainly the case is that the public is now more aware of the use of surveillance powers by agencies they had never realized were allowed to do such things.
Surveys have found that only 9% of RIPA authorizations resulted in either prosecution of enforcement action. In Australia, earlier this year, when only 28% of the use of targeted surveillance (in that case by police) resulted in prosecutions, their law was denounced as an excuse for ‘fishing expeditions.’ So what does a 9% rate indicate for Britain? Desperation perhaps? Or at least that RIPA was being massively overused for trivial issues. The House of Lords Constitution Committee report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, certainly thought so, arguing not only that the inadequate administrative procedures should be reviewed but also that the government should think again about the whole business of allowing Local Authorities police powers, and that in any case, these powers “should only be available for the investigation of serious criminal offences which would attract a custodial sentence of at least two years.”
The government has failed to take heed of these recommendations. Ok, so they have agreed to restrict the authorization of covert surveillance under RIPA to ‘Director, Head of Service, Service Manager or equivalent’, and that Local Authorities should designate compliance officers so there will be no more junior officers deciding to play James Bond, as in the Poole case. However, by going to a ‘consultation’ whose respondents were dominated by Local Authorities and other RIPA-enabled agencies, they have managed to avoid doing anything particularly radical. This started from limiting the scope of the review through the questions they asked in the consultation.
For example, by asking which covert investigatory techniques specifically should be removed (and discounting any views that said ‘all of them’) they managed to get a mixed set of answers that failed to produced a clear vote against any one technique. Result: no techniques get removed and in fact some of the existing allowed techniques get extended to yet more agencies, for example the new Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission (the replacement for the Child Support Agency). In particular, this extension of powers covers telecommunications data, whose keeping by the state has of course increased since RIPA was proposed. Now RIPA will be used to allow new bodies access to this data.
A curious note throughout the response by the government is the insistence on using an idea of non-interference with law-enforcement as a reason for not allowing elected officials any more than strategic scrutiny over the actions their own officials take under RIPA. This matters because RIPA is just one of many ways in which law-enforcement is not spreading as a function to increasing numbers of agencies beyond the police and judiciary. This seems to be general position that New Labour has taken – although it hasn’t always got its way – does anyone remember the dropped proposals to allow any ‘responsible people’ to levy on the spot fines?
And the government response seems to take a bullish delight in attacking those who have criticized the surveillance society. They insist, for example – and despite all the evidence to suggest that such interventions have limited effectiveness – that Local Authorities should make more use of overt, mass surveillance, like CCTV, instead of using RIPA. They are creating a binary choice, which seems to say assume that some kind of surveillance should be used: which do you choose, overt or covert? But, of course, that shouldn’t be the choice at all. They are also trying to have their cake and eat it on CCTV: the response to the consultation dismisses those consultees who brought up the subject of CCTV – which is not covered by RIPA – but feel quite able themselves to recommend its extended use in their own response. This of course also ignores the perfectly legitimate feeling amongst many that it is about CCTV was brought under proper control and a reformed RIPA might well be the place to do it.
Then there are things missing: notably, the concentration on Local Authorities, which for the most part has completely obscured the use of covert surveillance by central government departments and arms-length agencies including the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the NHS and the Environment Agency, all of which have been criticized in the past by the Surveillance Commissioner. Nothing seems to be proposed to increase the visibility of the RIPA Tribunal which is, just for now, in the news. The Lords described it as all but invisible and weak. Nor do the government propose to do anything to strengthen training or the Code of Practice, and in any case, there has been a huge over reliance on such self-regulation for matters which should have more formal control; this is also how CCTV and the security industry is largely – and incredibly ineffectively – regulated in the UK.
Pretty much anyone could have predicted this limp response from the Home Office to some rather serious problems. They don’t read their own research, they don’t do consultation in a meaningful manner, and then, surprise, surprise, they conclude that there really isn’t very much wrong after all. Jenny Paton and Tim Joyce may well disagree, and let us hope that the RIPA Tribunal do too.
RIPA to be limited
The UK Home Office is finally publishing plans to reform the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) which defined in law the surveillance powers open to hundreds of government bodies. You can see what I have previously said about the consultation here. The consultation on RIPA actually had 7 major questions. The Home Office has now responded to all the opinions offered during the consultation. In more detail, this is what was said:
1. Taking into account the reasons for requiring the use of covert investigatory techniques under RIPA set out for each public authority, should any of them nevertheless be removed from the RIPA framework?
Response: basically, none should be removed. Although the Home Office noted that many respondents had objections, they didn’t feel they added up. Indeed this section also seems to include extensions of the powers (or clarifications that act effectively as extensions) for example the ability of the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission (the replacement for the Child Support Agency), to have access to telecommunications data to investigate fathers required to pay child support. These extensions may be warranted or not, but they show the tendency for what Gary Marx long ago called ‘surveillance creep’ to occur – the saving of telecommunications data has increased since RIPA was proposed and now RIPA will be used to allow new agencies access to this data.
They also note that they will not be returning any of these investigatory functions to the police. This is interesting because later they use the reason of non-interference in law-enforcement for denying elected councillors detailed oversight. So this confirms a trend to less and less accountable law enforcement.
2. If any public authorities should be removed from the RIPA framework, what, if any, alternative tools should they be given to enable them to do their jobs?
Response: given the previous response, it is not surprising that no real change is proposed here. The Home Office in fact insists that more emphasis should be placed on overt surveillance by local authorities (like CCTV) in order to reduce the need to resort to RIPA’s covert surveillance!
3. What more should we do to reduce bureaucracy for the police so they can use RIPA more easily to protect the public against criminals?
This wasn’t a question that I ever noticed critics of RIPA asking. Some agencies seem to have objected to the amount of paperwork around RIPA and The Home Office “agrees that it is in no-one’s interests for documentation to be unnecessarily time-consuming” and they, for once, insist on a proper auditable trail that can help protect privacy. They say in any case, applications are already down massively.
There is an interesting note that suggests the increasing use of RIPA for counter-terrorism activities which is left rather open – “the Government is facilitating the work of police collaborative units, such as the regional counter-terrorist units… This means officers seeking to use techniques under RIPA will be able to apply to authorising officers in different forces, where the Chief Officers have made a collaboration agreement that permits this”, in other words that RIPA might be used for massive, blanket undercover surveillance operations. Now that certain wasn’t what the government has recently claimed it was intended for – although of course, as anyone with any kind of memory will recall, it was exactly the justification used for passing it.
4. Should the rank at which local authorities authorise the use of covert investigatory techniques be raised to senior executive?
Response: The media reports thus far have focused on the plan to limit the authorisation of such practices to council chief executives and directors – a recommendation made by the House of Lords Constitution Committee – what the Home Office actually recommends is to restrict the decision to a rather wider set: ‘Director, Head of Service, Service Manager or equivalent’. So, no junior officers any more, which is good, but not necessarily senior managers only. They also recommend having a compliance officer designated, which is good if they genuinely work on active and ethical compliance rather than thinking of excuses in retrospect.
5. Should elected councillors be given a role in overseeing the way local authorities use covert investigatory techniques?
Response: yes they should, but it should be ‘strategic’ and limited to once a year setting of policy and strategy with quarterly oversight meetings. They argue, as I mentioned earlier, that non-interference in law-enforcement is a good reason for keeping elected officials away from the details… Councillors in the UK have been increasingly hamstrung in the way that they can oversee their supposed bureaucracy, even to the point where they have been fined and suspended for criticising their own officers. Some real control would be welcome (after all, that is what the purpose of local democracy should be).
6. Are the Government’s other proposed changes in the Consolidating Orders appropriate?
Response: the Home Office basically rejected all the respondents’ comments on the proposals.
7. Do the revised Codes of Practice provide sufficient clarity on when it is necessary and proportionate to use techniques regulated in RIPA?
Response: the codes of practice will be made clearer. No more guidance will be given. The Guardian says that the proposals will ‘ban’ the use of RIPA for ‘minor matters’ but I can’t really see that they do this, and the points of such codes is usually to avoid recourse to the law by encouraging a voluntary self-regulation; it is how CCTV is largely – and incredibly ineffectively – regulated in the UK too.
Information-rich animals
Iris scanning has been proposed for horse by a company called Global Animal Management (GAM) Inc. As bloodstock is a huge and lucrative business – feeding everything from the private obsessions of the super-rich through the horseracing industry to the dreams of teenage horse-enthusiasts – it is not surprising to see such investment in biometrics. Racehorses were, after all, the first living creatures to be regularly microchipped. Vets seem sceptical about the idea, but surely members of the medical profession would be more enthusiastic about non-invasive replacements for invasive identification techniques like RFID?
Ironically, support for the scepticism comes form GAM’s own website, where a very interesting short video shows just how comprehensive the surveillance of animals through RFID chips has become. RFID chips do not just identify, they carry whole life-cycle information on origins, movements, health and disease and legal compliances. And because of the chips this information is carried with the animal not simply associated with it via a distant database as the result of an occasional scan. The system creates what GAM calls ‘information-rich animals’, which presumably is what makes GAM – and it hopes, its customers – cash-rich too…
(thanks to Aaron Martin, whose reading now seems to include Horse and Hound magazine…)
Would Canadians be “safer with a camera on every corner”?
I haven’t got very involved with Canadian debates on surveillance yet (but don’t worry, I will!). However a comment piece in Thursday’s Globe and Mail, which demanded that Canadian cities install ubiquitous video surveillance, prompted me to pen an immediate letter, which was signed by both Professor David Lyon and myself. It was published today, slightly edited – the full version is below. (They also decided to edit out our respective titles, which makes me look senior to Professor Lyon. Oops.)
“Marcus Gee writes that “We’d be safer with a camera on every corner” (Comment, May 22nd, p.15). If only this were true. However it simply is not the case.
Mr Gee quotes the UK as an example of where video surveillance is effective, but this is not supported by the crime figures in the UK or by academic research. The most comprehensive evaluation of all studies done of the effects of CCTV on crime (by the Campbell Collaboration, 2009) concluded that it had little or not effect on the occurrence of violent crimes like the disgraceful murder of Christopher Skinner, which prompted Mr Gee to write. Even the limited British police assessment of CCTV conducted by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2008, admitted this was the case.
It is easy to demand that ‘something must be done’ as a response to any particular incident of violent crime, and CCTV is the currently fashionable ‘something.’ But let us get beyond the superficial and look at the evidence. Then we could have a proper debate about CCTV.”
Surveillance cameras in the favelas (4): more from the other side
The mainstream Bazilian media outlet, O Globo, is reporting that Fabiano Atanázio da Silva (AKA ‘FB’ or ‘Urubu’), allegedly a leader of the Amigos dos Amigos (‘Friends of Friends’) on Morro de Macaros, who recently tried to take control of the neighbouring favela, Morro São João, resulting in many deaths and even bringing down a police helicopter, had also installed a video surveillance system in his favela, which monitored the entrances of the favela and watched the movements of police and residents. So, it seems that it is clearly the traficante gangs who were first to install CCTV in the favelas of Rio for the purposes of helping to maintain a violent authority over the local area. The form of surveillance is what Bruno Latour perceptively called ‘oligoptic’ – a spatially limited vision but one which is very powerful within its limits. And of course, given the massive extent of private security and both legal and illegal surveillance equipment available in Brazil, it’s hardly surprising that gangs with disposable cash would invest in security like this. However, what is particularly interesting is that by doing the same thing and installing a video surveillance system in Santa Marta against the wishes of the local community, the military police are seen as effectively operating like a gang. This isn’t such a startling statement and was one which was quite frequently put to us by community representatives who we interviewed in the favelas of Rio earlier this year.
(thanks, again, to the invaluable Paola Barreto Leblanc for the information).
Surely this is satire? Charles Clarke on liberty and security…
A comment piece allegedly by the former UK Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, has been posted on The Guardian newspaper’s site. I say ‘allegedly’ because it is hard to believe that a man in his position could write something to monumentally lacking in self-awareness or with less understanding of the issues he is discussing. He talks of a fourth Labour term (which is in itself increasingly a fantasy in which few, even in the Labour Party, believe) in which liberty and security are unified, “to consolidate the new constitutional relationships, establish consensus about the powers of the police and security services and address issues relating to identity”! He talks of CCTV and the DNA database as great advances, with no mention of the slamming of the operation of this database by the European Court of Human Rights and the massive climb-down by the government, or that fact that research commissioned by his own former Home Office Research Department shows that CCTV has little effect on crime. He claims that there is “an understandable public demand for more databases”; this will come as news to most people.He even claims that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) has been a success, ignoring the critical views of the regulators and the last Home Secretary’s promise to review legislation that has been used for all kinds of intrusive and inappropriate surveillance activities by local authorities.
Of course he is right that Labour deserves credit for establishing the Human Rights Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and for unifying the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Yet these were all things that were done (or planned) in Labour’s first term and there has been little to celebrate in terms of liberty and security in Labour’s two terms since then, when even the ICO emerged, under former commissioner Richard Thomas, as one of the most trenchant critics of Labour’s activities.
But then right near the end, he suddenly switches to an entirely different line arguing that “The government needs to establish a coherent data regime that places the individual at the centre, with the practical right to see the data held on them and correct it if necessary. They should also be able to see who made any changes to data that is stored (and when the changes were made), and to give permission for the sharing of any data which is held”. The second sentence however misses the point of what the first implies (which in itself suggests that the regime Labour has created is incoherent). A data regime which places the individual at the centre would start not from permissions for sharing, but by asking what data needs to be stored, why, how and by whom. It would be based not a presumption of permission to share but on a request for such sharing with full disclosure of the purposes – that is the meaning of ‘transparency’, a word he uses in the next sentence, but missing from all of this are the words ‘consent’ and ‘accountability’. They are rather too important to be absent by chance.
And of course there is no mention at all of the role Labour has played in the EU and in other international fora, in spreading illiberal security ideas across national borders. The acceptance by the UK of things like the Prum Treaty and the Stockholm program have received almost no comment from British politicians on any part of the political spectrum (except in a general context of anti-EU nationalism, which misses the important issues involved).
All in all, if this is real, which I still can hardly believe, this is an astonishingly brazen and aggressively arrogant piece. It says everything about why, in terms of liberty and security, Labour have already lost the argument and why the country will hand over power at the next election to a bunch of upper-class twits with no coherent policies – in others words, anyone in preference to a party that once claimed that ‘things can only get better’ but has long since stopped even pretending that this is the case…
Surveillance image of the week 3: remembering One and Other
One and Other, Anthony Gormley’s remarkable populist and popular participatory artwork, which enabled 2400 ordinary people to spend an hour each on the vacant fourth plinth in London’s Trafalgar Square, ended recently. Not surprisingly, given London’s reputation as a the surveillance capital of the world, there were some pointed reminders. This ‘plinther’ spent her hour dressed as a CCTV camera looking at the watchers and the watched…

(thanks to Eric Stoddart for this)
Surveillance cameras in the favelas (2)
A couple of weeks ago, I found out that the military police had installed surveillance cameras in the favela of Santa Marta, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which I visited back in April. This is the first time such police cameras have been put into such informal settlements in Rio. My friend and colleague, Paola Barreto Leblanc, sent me this link to these youtube broadcasts from a local favela TV company, in which residents discuss their (largely negative) views of the cameras.
There is also a poster that has been put up around the area produced by the Community Association and other local activist and civil society groups – see here – which reads as follows in English:
SANTA MARTA , THE MOST WATCHED PLACE IN RIO
At the end of August, the inhabitants of Santa Marta were surprised to learn from newspapers and TV that nine surveillance cameras would be installed in different areas of the favela. A fear of being misinterpreted paralysed the community.
Many of the people of the city, and some in the Moro itself support this initiative. However, we are a pacified favela, so why do they keep treating us as dangerous?
Walls, three kinds of police, 120 soldiers, cameras – this is no exaggeration. When will we be treated as ordinary citizens instead of being seen as suspects?
Wall: 2 million Reais, Cameras, half a million Reais. How many houses could this amount of money build? How many repairs to the water and sewage system?
The last apartments built in Santa Marta are 32 square metres. The Popular Movement for Housing [an NGO] says that the minimum size should be 42 square metres. Other initiatives have gone with 37 square metres. So why don’t we stand up and demand this minimum standard? This should be our priority!
When will the voice of the inhabitants of this community be heard?
We need collective discussion and debate.
Fear is paralysing this community and preventing criticism. But the exercise of our rights is the only guarantee of freedom.
“Peace without a voice is fear”
We want to discuss our priorities. We want to know about and be involved in the urban development project in Santa Marta.
We will only be heard and respected if we unite.
Think, talk, reflect, debate, get involved…